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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RICHARD A. RICCI, 
Defendant-Appellant 
. 
. 
. 
. No. 18l65 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a crimi~~l proceeding brought by the State of Utah' 
against Richard A. Ri.cci .~charging him with having committed the ·crime of 
Burglary of a Non-dwelling in violation of Section 76-6-202,:·.utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION~IN THE LOWER COURT. 
~~- The defendant was found guilty of Burglary of a Non-dwelling 
after a jury trial on November 17, 1981 in the District Court in and for 
Carbon County, State of. Utah, the Honorab le·-· .. Boyd Bunne 11 presiding. -:·ffh.e 
court pronounced judgment on November 17, 1981 and sentenced the defendant 
to be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five. years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing the judgment 
rendered at the trial and a ruling remanding the cause to the trial court 
for a new trial. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant··was charged with having burglarized the BEJO, 
a bar on Main Street in Helper, Utah in the early morning hours of 
October 11, 1981. 
The testimony of witnesses called by the.pros~cution showed 
that a Helper·c;ty Police Officer; ¥1hile making routine door checks, saw 
the defendant exiting through the rear door of the BEJO at approximately 
. 3:50 A.M. (T.26) The officer and defendant engaged in a brief conversa-
tion until several other officers arriv~d, at which time the officers 
· ··and the defendant entered the BEJO. The officers testified that they 
frisked the defendant and found a screwdriver without handle in the 
defendant's right pocket (T.28), observed a trash can containing certain 
items (T.31 & 32), observed the back door lock lying on the floor (T.45), 
found several v~riding ma2hines to have been vandalized (T.48) and papers 
scattered on the floor behind the bar (T.49). 
The defendant was placed under arrest at the scene and then 
taken to the Carbon County Sheriff's Office where he was interrogated by 
Officer Charles Semken. An incriminating statement was given by the 
defendant to Officer Semken (T.90) to which defendant's counsel objected 
at trial (T.90). 
The defendant testified that he was walking by the back of 
the BEJO when he saw the rear door open and a light on. He entered 
the building believing that it was open for business (T.110), went to 
-2-
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the front of the bar, saw the scattered papers (T. 105), turned around 
and left and then met the officer who was making the door checks (R.107) 
The defendant denied having conmitted the burglary (T.106) and claimed 
that the papers were on the floor and the vending machines had been 
vandalized before he arrived. 
·.' 
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POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO THE JURY 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4. 
The trial court refused to give the jury defendant's re-
quested Jury Instruction Number 4 which read as follows: 
11 You are instructed that the entry of a person into 
the building of another is not unlawful if the person 
reasonably oelieves that the business in the building 
is open to the general public at the time he enters. 11 
The testimony of the defendant at trial shows that he 
reasonably believed the BEJO to be open to the public at the time he 
entered the. door: 
Q: Did you have to force the door open at the time 
you went in? 
A: No. It was open. 
Q: At the time that you went in did you notice whether the 
bar was open or closed? 
A: I thought it was open. 
Q: Why did you think it was open? 
A: I saw lights and the door was open. 
(Transcript at p. 110) 
The defendant's testimony showed that his expressed intent 
in going to the BEJO was to get a drink, (T.104) not to commit a crime. 
(T.111) 
The issue then becomes one of whether the defendant's upon 
the BEJO property was unlawful even when his testimony showed he thought 
the premises were open to the public. 
-4-
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Section 76-6-201(3) defines "enters or remains unlawfully" 
as used in the definition of Burglary as follows: 
"(3) A person "enters or rema.jns unlawfully" in or upon 
premises when the premises or any portion .. thereof at the 
time of the entry or remaining are not open to the~u~lic 
and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or·pr1v1ledged 
to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof." 
Utah law does not define the phrase "open to the public" as used in 
the above- definition. However, the State of Oregon has a burglary 
statute similar in wording to that of Utah 1·s and defines ''open to the 
pu bl i c 11 as : 
11 premises.which by their physical nature function, 
custom, usage, notice or lack thereof or other circum-
stances at the time would cause a reasonable person to 
believe that no··permission to enter or remain is required." 
(ORS 164.205(4)) 
, In State v. Taylor, 522 P.2d 499 (1974 Oregon) the defendant 
was arrested in the laundry room of an apartment complex. He testified 
that he was driving through the City of Eugene when he saw the apart-
ment complex and stopped, thinking he could do his laundry. He tried 
its closed door, found it to be unlocked, and then entered. His defense 
to the burglary·charge was that his entry into the laundry room was not 
unlawful because that room was open to the public. 
Although the Court in Taylor was concerned with whether an 
instruction on a lesser included offense should have been given, the 
following statement of the Court is significant: 
"Eviden-c: i~dicating that the laundry room was open to 
t~e public 1nc~u~ed the fact that it was not locked, that 
lights were shining outside the apartment build. d tha~ there w~s no sign outside the laundry faci~~f • ~nd. 
eating that it was limited to private Th i Y in ,_ 
contrary evidence: no si ns or li ~se: .ere was also 
was open to the public--gor even i~t~ ~~dicat1ng the laundry 
no lights on inside the laundry roo~ the roo~ was a laundry, 
to 4 a.m.' and a sign inside the la 'd e ear Y ho~r - 3 
un ry room stating the 
-5-
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hours were 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. Resolution of this conflicting 
evidence was properly for the jury. However, it would have 
been quite rational for the jury to conclude that this evi-
dence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
laundry facility was not open to the public. Defendant's 
requested instruction on theft should have been given. 
(522 P.2d at 501) (underlining added.) 
Defendant's requested instruction in the instant case was an 
attempt to provide the .,iury with an opportunity to consider the defen-
dant's contention that he did not unlawfully enter or remain on the 
premises and therefore committed no burglary. 
The instruction was justified since it hannonized with the 
evidence presented by the defendant and was consistent with his theory 
of defense. 
The Oregon statute defining the phrase uopen to the public" 
wisely contemplated factual situations in which one might enter upon 
business property reasonably believing the same to be open, when the 
management had intended that it be considered closed. Surely the Utah 
Legislature, by failing to define "open to the public" cannot have 
intended the opposite to be the law of this state, e.g., that any entry 
upon property, regardless of the appearance of the business, is un-
lawful if the management had intended that it be closed. Since a 
b~siness such as the BEJO encourages patrons to come upon its premises 
it ought to bear the burden of its appearance and be bound by the im-
pression it creates on potential customers. Even though an invitation 
was not intended by the management, it would seem to be reasonable to 
conclude that the BEJO in this instance was extending an invitation to 
business visitors to enter upon its premises if the door was open and 
the lights were on at the time the defendant entered. This assertion 
is supportable also by the Oregon definition of "open to the public" 
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since the 11 premises ... by their physical nature, fu~ction, usage ... at 
the time would cause a· reasonable person to believe that no permission 
to enter or remian is required 11 (ORS 164.205(4)) The defendant was 
entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury. 
By failing to give defendant's requested· instruction No.4, 
the Trial Court erroneously prevented the possible determination by 
the jury that the entry of the defendant was lawful and that therefore 
no burglary occurred. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PROSECUTION'S MOTION 
TO AMEND THE INFORMATION. 
After both sides had rested and exceptions to the jury 
instructions had been taken the State ~oved to·amend·the charging part of 
the information by adding the phrase"or remained in" so that the 
Information finally read as follows (T.119-120): 
"That the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid 
unlawfully entered or remained in the building of another 
with the intent to commit a theft, to-wit: the Be-Jo Club" 
The defendant objected to the Motion (T.120) but the Court 
permitted the amendment, stating that the defendant would not be 
prejudiced.(T.120). 
Section 77-35-4, Utah Code Annotated, permits an amendment 
to an information to be made on the following conditions: 
The court may permit an indictment or information to be 
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or 
differenct offense is charged and the substantial rights 
of the defendant are not prejudiced. 
-7-
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0The defendant contends that his substantial rights were 
prejudiced by the amendment. The defendant had prepared his case by 
preparations designed to show that his entry onto the BEJO premises 
was not unlawful. The ·nformation on which the defendant relied 
throughout the-trial claimed only that the defendant entered the 
premises unlawfully - it did not assert that the defendant 11remained 11 
unlawfully. Consequently, the···testimony elicited by defense:counsel 
from the defendant in cross-examination was primarily aimed at show-
ing the defendant thought. the .. _BEJO was open at the time of entry. Had 
counsel known at the commencement of trial that the prosecution would 
attempt to show and claim an unlawful remaining, defense counsel could-~ 
have and would have framed questions relating to the "unlawful re-
maining 11 • 
The motion was.also untimely for the reason that defendant 1 s. 
requested jury instruction had already been submitted to. the Court by 
defendant. The defendant had no opportunity to prepare any instruction 
which would attempt to help· the jury determine whether an unlawful re-
maining had occurred. 
In State v.Rohletter 160 P.2d 963(U~ah 1945) and in State v. 
Ri-cken,berg, 58 Utah 270, 198 P. 767, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
under the then existing Utah statute, 
" ... no amendment could be made which would essentially 
alter the nature of the case, so as to prejudice the 
defendant in making·his defense. 11 (160 P.2d at 964) 
Although the Court in Ro~J_e_tter,supra, was considering the 
situation where an information charging rape was amended to add a count 
charging the crime of carnal knowledge, the reasoning of the court in 
-8-
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reversing the conviction is applicable in the case at bar: 
The defendant sought throughout his c~ass-examination to 
show that the plaintiff .had consented to the sexual act-
which would ·have defeated the charge of rape.but would ~ot 
have been a defense to the charge of carnal knowledge. 
We cannot assume that the same jury would have bee~ selected, 
the,same questions asked, th~ s~me evide~ce emphasized, had 
the information from·the beg1nn1ng contained both counts. 
The addition of the second count charging a new and separate 
offense at this stage of the proceeding was prejudicial. 
The judgment is r~versed and the matter remanded for W-
further proceedings. -1 ': .•. 
In the Rohletter case, defense counsel concentrated on th~ 
issue of consent. It appears that 11 consent 11 was only element distinguish-
ing rape and carnal knowledge from each other. In the instant case the 
addition of the ph~ase· 11 or remained in" was as significant and pr~.judicial 
to defendant as was the addition of the carnal knowledge count in Rohletter-
significant because defendant was not placed on notice at any time through-
out the trial that he would need to defend himself against a claim 
that he unlawfully- remai·ned on· the premises. Each step of the trial and_ 
preliminary ,hearing proceeded in the light -Of ·an information charg·ing 
that defendant had unlawfully entered and not mentioning unlawfully re-
maining. 
The amendment allowed the jury. the possibility of findin_g that 
the defendant did not "enter unlawfully" but that he 11 unlawfully re-
mained''. The action of the trial court in granting the motion to amend 
was prejudicial by failing to timely place the defendant on notice that 
he would have to defend against'the allegation contained in the amend-
ment. The defendant was thus deprived of his right "to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the;actusation'' in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and in violation of 
-9-
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the due process clause of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
NUMBER 4. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION 
Instruction Number 4, as given by the Court read as follows: 
Before you can convict the defendant of burglary, as charged 
in the Information, you must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt the following elements: 
1. That the defendant, on or about October 11,1981, 
unlawfully entered or remained in a building of another; 
2. That at ·the time of such entry or unlawfully re-
maining he had the intent to commit a theft. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each of these 
essential elements of the offense of burglary beyond a 
reasonable doubt it is your duty to convict the defendant 
of the crime of burglary as stated in the Information. 
If the evidence has failed to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt one or more of the said elements, then you should find 
the defendant not guilty of the crime of burglary as charged 
in the Information. (Record at 31) 
The defendant excepted to the instruction upon the grounds 
that the phrase 11 or remained" should not have been included in the 
instruction. (T. 119) The exception finds its basis in defendant's 
claim that the original information did not charge the defendant with 
"unlawfully remaining". Defendant herein incorporates the argument and 
reasoning set forth in Point II as the balance of the argument for this 
Point III. 
-10-
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE CONTENTS OF A WASTE 
CAN INTO EVIDENCE 
On motion of the prosecution the Trial Court admitted into 
evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit No.3 which purported to be a yellow~trash 
bucket containing numerous small ·items. (T.58-59) Defendant 1 s objec-
tion to the admission of the collective contents on the ground of 
. i nsuffi ci ent foundation was overruled. ·(T .··59) 
In Carter v. State, 446 P. 2d 165 (Nevada 1969) .the Supreme. 
Court of Nevada set forth the standard to be met by a party seeking 
to admit physical evidence: 
"The statement that the exhibit is the identical 
object or reasonably resembles it~and that it is 
. in the same condition as at the time the offense 
occurred makes the exhibit admissible." 
The testimony of the officer stated that the contents of 
the can were the identical objects as set forth in the inventory. 
But the second requirement of the test set forth in Carter was not met, 
i.e., the officer did not testify that the contents of the waste basket 
we-re in the same condition as at the ... time the offense occurred. 
Defendant also objects to the collective admission of the 
contents in order td prevent any items~being. admitted into evidence 
which may not havei been i ndi. vi dually described on the inventory pre-
pared by the officer. The inventory was prepared by the officer 
shortly after the contents were seized in the BEJO.(T.32) However, 
there was no testimony to show that~the officer had reviewed the 
contents prior to trial to detennine whether the contents corresponded 
to the inventory·taken at the time of their seizure~ 
-11-
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Defendant submits that the better procedure would have 
been for each item in the waste can to have been individually marked 
and identified so as to prevent any item from being included as part 
of the exhibit when it may not have .been listed on the inventory. 
There is now no way in which any reviewing court can determine whether 
the items in the. waste basket were the same items presented for 
admission at trial. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING OFFICER CHARLES SEMKEN TO 
TESTIFY TO A STATEMENT MADE TO HIM BY THE DEFENDANT. 
Over objection of counsel, Deputy Charles Semken testified 
to an incriminating statement made to him by the defendant shortly 
after the arrest.(T.90-91) The defendant acknowledges that his 
"Miranda Rights" were given to him priO'r to the statement but denies 
·that he waived them.(T.90) 
There can be no doubt that the statement of the defendant 
was extremely damaging to him and constitutes reversible error if 
improperly admitted. 
A review of the record shows that the defendant was told 
of his rights and then the following dialogue occurred: 
11 
••• arid I asked him if he understood those things. 
And he said, yes, he did. 
Q. Then what happened? 
A. I asked him what happen· over in Helper. He 
said, 11 I got caught. 11 (T.90) 
The transcript as set forth above shows that there was no 
-12-
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express waiver -- the defendant merely affirmed that he-understood 
those rights. The issue presented is whether waiver can be implied 
by reason of the fact that the defendant responded to the questioning 
by Deputy Semken. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 346, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, clearly defined the principles that 
govern once the required warnings have been given: 
"If the interrogation continues without the presence 
of an attorney·and a statement is taken, a heavy burden 
rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against 
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed 
counsel ... This Court has always set high standards of 
proof for the waiver of constitutional rights ... , and we 
re-assert these standards as applied to jn-custody 
interrogation. Since the State is .responsible for estab-
lishing the isolated circumstances under which the 
interrogation takes place and has the only means of 
making available corroborated evidence of warnings given 
during incommunicado interrogation, (444 US 471) the 
burden is rightly on its shoulders." 16 L.Ed2d at 724 
Applying the test set forth in Miranda it is clear that the 
burden is on the State to demonstrate waiver ~ it is not required of 
the defendant to show that he did not waive his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to appointed counsel. Even prior to Miranda 
i~Carnle,Yv. Cochran, 369 US 506, 8 L.Ed 2d 70, 82 S.Ct.884 (1962) the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. 
The record must show, or there must be an allegation and 
evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel 
but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. 
Anything less is not waiver." 8 L.Ed. 2d 77 
Although the "warning 11 was given to the defendant the 
transcript is void of any evidence which would show that the defendant 
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. 
-13-
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In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 60 L.Ed 2d 286, 
99 S.Ct. 1755 (1980) the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court may find 
an intelligent and understanding rejection of counsel in situations · 
where the defendant did not expressly state as much: 
[lb] An express written or oral statement of waiver of 
the right to remain silent or of the right to· counsel 
is usually strong proof of the validity of that wa.iver, 
but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient 
to establish waiver. The question is not-one of form, 
but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and 
voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda· 
case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere 
silence is not enough. That does not mean that the 
defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of 
his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, 
may never support a conclusion that a defendant has 
waived his rights. The courts must presume that a 
defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's 
burden is great;but in at least some cases waiver can 
be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the 
person interrogated. 
Defendant submits that his actions and words did not constitute 
a waiver of his rights. The prosecution's burden requires that more 
care be taken than in this situation where the defendant was given 
his warnings, asked if he understood those rights, and then questioned 
with regard to the incident. No good faith effort was made to determine 
whether the defendant wanted an attorney present or whether he wanted 
to make a statement. 
Where the record fails to reveal that the defendant made an 
intelligent waiver the court under the principle of Butler, supra, 
"must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights ... 11 (60 L.Ed 2d. 286 
-14-
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing points, the Appellant ~·c 
respectfully submits that the judgment rendered at trial be reversed 
and the cause remanded to the trial court for the purpose of a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RYCE 
Attor e for Appellant 
690 E t Main Street 
P.O. Box 444 
Price, Utah 84501 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, BRYCE K. BRYNER, hereby certify that I personally served 
two (2) copies of the above and foregoin9BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon 
DAVID WILKINSON, Attorney General of the State of Utah, by delivering 
s~id copies to the Office of the Attorney General at 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah this 17th day of May, 1982. 
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